CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY by Adams, Claire-Louise & Goldsmith, Peter D.
Conditions for
Successful Strategic








ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on strategic fuzzy alliances (SFAs) and
the role of trust in business-to-business relationships. First, a theoretical
model of governance choice involving strategic alliances is developed,
integrating the Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) taxonomy of
trust into a neoinstitutional framework. Second, this model, based on
transaction theory, is then used to generate necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for trust-based agreements. The third component of this
paper is an empirical model, which tests the above theory. Finally,
managerial implications from the results are discussed.
Many changes in the global economy have increased the efﬁciency and speed with
which ﬁrms gather information and compete on a world scale. As a result of these
changes, foreign competition is increasing, product life cycles are shortening, and
markets are becoming more specialized. Traditional barriers for the ﬁrm such as
duties, tariffs and nontariff barriers are being broken down or eliminated by trade
agreements such as GATT and NAFTA (Amanor-Boadu and Martin, 1992; Cohn,
1993). These global and regional agreements have affected trade patterns and, by
favoring specialization, the location of production (West and Vaughan, 1995).
One critical element of ﬁrm survival is the governance structure of the ﬁrm.
The hierarchical structure of a company and the degree to which a company
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ISSN: 1096-7508 All rights of reproduction in any form reservedinternalizes decisions affects the company’s efﬁciency, both internally and
externally. In such a fast-paced environment low operating costs are a key to
ﬁnancial success, and quick, accurate decision making is paramount. The need to
respond to a situation quickly and easily, but also cost effectively, has induced
managers to look outside their own companies to other ﬁrms for cooperative
agreements.
This paper focuses on the formation of new business arrangements, such as
strategic fuzzy alliances (SFAs), which are unique because they involve trust. The
aim of this paper is to analyze these alliances and the role of trust in
business-to-business relationships. First, a theoretical model of governance choice
involving strategic alliances is developed, integrating the Shapiro et al. (1992)
taxonomy of trust into a neoinstitutional framework. Second, our model, based on
transaction theory, is then used to generate necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
trust-based agreements. The third component of this paper is an empirical model,
which tests the above theory. The model uses a recent survey, conducted by
Dionne, Lambert, Romaine, and Cofﬁn (1996), of horticultural and pork process-
ing ﬁrms and a multinomial logit technique in order to explain the governance
choice decision. Finally, managerial implications are discussed focusing on
relationship building and relationship management.
THEORETICAL MODEL
Background
In 1937, Coase (in Williamson, 1991) theorized that by internalizing transactions,
governance costs could be reduced at times while, at other times, the market has
a valuable role to play in a ﬁrm’s ability to compete. In the 1970s Williamson used
Coase’s theories as the basis for transaction cost economics, adding to them
human elements such as opportunism and bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985;
Simon, 1957). From this, a continuum of governance choice has become the
foundation of transaction economics (see Figure 1).
There are three sections to the continuum of governance: from left to right they
are the spot market; quasi-integrated alliances; and vertically integrated ﬁrms. At
the spot market there are many buyers and sellers, transactions are governed by
price signals (Sporleder, 1992), and property and ownership are fully deﬁned; thus
a contract is not necessary. In the area of vertical integration there is 100%
ownership. All business units have a similar overriding objective and a common
culture. A commonality exists here that may not be found in other areas of the
continuum and, as a result, a contract is not necessary. Quasi-integrated ﬁrms, in
the center of the continuum, govern transactions through contracts. Here bilateral
trading partners avoid the costs of arranging each and every transaction in the spot
market while still not fully internalizing the transaction either.
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internalized and external costs to the ﬁrm decrease. On the other hand, the
intricacy of the transaction increases, the assets involved in an agreement become
more specialized to that agreement (increasing asset speciﬁcity), and governance
structures become more complex (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). The elements
contributing to bounded rationality and opportunism increase, making the
transaction environment more risky. Bounded rationality and opportunism, the
cornerstones of transaction costs, are major causative forces for contracting under
conditions of moderate levels of speciﬁcity and internalizing at higher levels of
speciﬁcity. Not only do individuals search for governance structures that reduce
direct costs, but also methods for protecting against opportunistic behavior from
their bilateral trading partners. Thus trust has a direct role in cost reduction
because, in the limit, with complete trust there is no opportunism (Chiles and
McMackin, 1996).
The theoretical and empirical question which is the focus of this research is :
where do trust-based alliances, such as strategic fuzzy alliances, fall on the
governance choice continuum? Although much has been written about opportun-
ism, neoinstitutional economics is devoid of work addressing trust-based gover-
nance structures such as SFAs.
Figure 1. Continuum of Governance with Transaction Cost Economic
Attributes
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While neo-classical economics is founded on the notion of competition and
opportunism, which is the basis of behavior for economic man, fuzzy alliances
involve co-operation, loosely speciﬁed prerogatives, and a trusting environment
(Sporleder, 1993). The boundaries of neo-classical ﬁrms are strictly deﬁned and
distinct, whereas fuzzy alliances are highly ﬂexible and their boundaries much
less clear (Sporleder, 1993). In a fuzzy alliance there is shared control. The system
is an open structure where knowledge ﬂows easily between the two ﬁrms, as
through a “membrane” connecting two living organisms (Hamel, 1991). Success
is based on co-operation, using each other’s wisdom and ideas to advance both
ﬁrms into the future. Innovation, learning and communication are encouraged, to
allow ﬁrms to keep pace in a rapidly changing environment, innovation, learning
and communication are encouraged (Vyas, Shelburn, and Rogers, 1995). In the
event of mistakes or misjudgements exit costs are low allowing ﬁrms to break
relations quickly and easily (Sporleder, 1992). Each partner is a stakeholder but
not necessarily a shareholder in the operation (Sporleder, 1993). A key feature of
the non-contract-based alliance is trust. Maintaining trust in the relationship
allows for a level of ﬂexibility and rapid change, not attainable in traditional
business alliances.
Being able to maintain trust in a business relationship can be highly advanta-
geous to all parties involved. Through trust there is: 1) a decrease in transaction
costs, 2) an increase in ﬂexibility for both companies, 3) an increase in knowledge
and 4) a decrease in risk (Maitland, Bryson, and Van de Ven ,1985; Shapiro et
al.,1992; Dodgson,1993; and Parkhe,1993). Interestingly, it was even shown by
Axelrod (Hill,1990, p. 507) “. . . that over time actors whose decision rules
stressed co-operation and trust, rather than opportunism, came to dominate the
population of players.” Without trust a fuzzy alliance cannot exist; therefore to
understand strategic fuzzy alliances completely it is necessary to analyze and
discuss the key component of these agreements, trust.
Trust: necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. SFAs fall under a broader category
of new
1governance structures, strategic alliances (SAs). Alternatively, those
alliances that primarily rely on binding mechanisms other than trust may, for
simplicity, be described as contract-based and for the purposes of this paper be
identiﬁed as strategic contract alliances (SCA) (see Figure 2). On the continuum
of governance choice, strategic contract alliances reside between spot markets and
vertical integration in the area of hybrid structures. They represent the broad class
of SA involving more formal coordination and which have been described as joint
ventures, equity partnerships, development agreements, supply agreements, man-
ufacturing collaboration and marketing agreements (Nohria, 1991). While the
taxonomy of strategic alliances is not the focus of this paper,
2it is enough to say
though that SCAs encompass many types of strategic bilateral trading arrange-
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joint venture, but the choice of partners or the objectives of the alliance are
nontraditional. SFAs on the other hand utilize trust as a governance mechanism,
substituting it for a contract as the transaction’s binding force.
Trust is a necessary condition in the formation of an SFA and is deﬁned as
“. . . the expectation by one person, group or ﬁrm of ethically justiﬁable
Figure 2. Strategic Alliances and Trust
225behavior...o nt h epart of the other person, group, or ﬁrm in a joint endeavor or
economic exchange” (Hosmer, 1995). Two elements of the human psyche are
utilized when an individual makes a decision to trust: cognitive (C) and emotional
(E) thought (Lewis and Weigert, 1985) (see Figure 2). The cognitive component
refers to the ability of an individual to rationally determine whether or not
someone is worth the risk of being trusted. The emotional feature is related to
sensory responses elicited by all humans in acknowledgment of preferences or
feelings for people or things.
Within the context of cognitive and emotional decision making, the elements
that are believed to engender trust are: knowledge, risk, free will and predictability
(Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Dodgson, 1993; Dasgupta, 1988; Luhmann, 1988;
Gambetta, 1988). Independently, these elements do not create trust, however,
when joined together in speciﬁc combinations they are sufﬁcient for its formation.
Knowledge
Knowledge can be gained from previous experiences, research, reputation or
conversation. It allows one to determine from the past what the future might hold,
and in this way permits us to predict future outcomes. Knowledge itself does not
cause trust, but it is an important ingredient (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). In the
event of perfect knowledge, complete rationality, trust is not necessary (Gambetta,
1988) and in the event of no knowledge, a gamble has taken place and trust has
not been formed (Lewis and Weigert, 1985).
Predictability
This is the ability to rely on the actions of others based on prior knowledge.
One must have enough knowledge of an individual or ﬁrm to allow for inference
as to possible future actions based on past events or information, i.e., it must be
possible to predict an outcome a priori. At low levels of knowledge, prediction is
a cognitive action and a function of information quality. At higher levels of
knowledge, i.e., identiﬁcation (Shapiro et al., 1992), predictability is not so much
cognitive as an emotive action.
Free will
Free will refers to the ability of an individual to make a choice of whether or
not to trust another individual, group or ﬁrm. By using a combination of cognitive
and emotional elements this decision is made either consciously (through logical
decision making) or unconsciously. For example, if an individual is given two
choices: 1) that his/her company may decrease research and development costs by
forming a trust-based alliance with another ﬁrm, or 2) that the company might fall
behind if it goes it alone, the ﬁrm has an opportunity to choose a course of action
(free will). On the other hand, if the ﬁrm or individual is in a position of duress
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really exist and trust is not apparent in the relationship (Nooteboom, 1996). Thus
free will is fundamental to trust formation.
Risk
The ﬁnal element, and the most crucial to the formation of trust, is risk. A
person places themselves in a situation of risk when they enter into a relationship
where perfect information is not available, future events are uncertain or there is
a possibility of injury and/or loss (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Chiles, 1996;
Lewis and Weigert,1985). In order for trust to occur, risk must exist (Luh-
mann,1988). Without risk, trust is not necessary as all information is present and
the future can be determined with certainty or, if it can’t be determined with
certainty, the unexpected event is as good as the expected event, therefore riskless.
If someone plays the lottery and knows with certainty the number of other
tickets in the lottery, the probability of their ticket being selected can be
calculated. Trust is not necessary because one knows with certainty the event will
take place and thus there is a ﬁxed chance of winning. However, if someone enters
a lottery and the number of tickets sold is unknown then the future possibility of
winning is not possible to calculate. One must trust that it is a fair game but
because not all information is available and future events are unpredictable, the
expectation of winning has been decreased. Thus the element of risk is an
important component for the formation of trust.
All four elements, knowledge, predictability, free will, and risk, do not have to
be present for trust. In speciﬁc combinations they are sufﬁcient for trust and form
the backdrop to the empirical tests developed further along in this paper. With
respect to the question of SFAs these elements together constitute the sufﬁcient
conditions to form trust.
Free will is captured in the empirical model because governance choice
decisions are being modeled. Consistent with neoinstitutional theory, the ﬁrm/
agent is making a cost minimizing decision where the choice of governance
structure is made (Goldsmith and Sporleder,1998). Risk too is evident in the
decision process. Ceteris paribus, transaction risk increases along the continuum
due to increasing asset speciﬁcity (Nooteboom, 1993; Goldsmith and Sporleder,
1998).
The ﬁnal element for trust to form is some form of knowledge. Knowledge can
come in a variety of forms. It may arise through cooperation, familiarity, or
reputation (see Figure 2).
Cooperation is deﬁned as the act of working with another group or ﬁrm to
achieve a common goal. It takes place before trust is established and through
repeated actions of cooperation, trust will be created (Gambetta, 1988). Thus
cooperation is a sufﬁcient condition for acquiring knowledge and trust-based
227relationships should be positively correlated to ﬁrms which have a history of
working together (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992; Gulati, 1995 ).
Knowledge can also arise through familiarity; that is, having a common
heritage, experiences, or culture. Geography (same region), organizational form
(cooperative), language, and heritage (entrepreneurial start-up) all may enhance
the formation of trust.
A ﬁnal condition sufﬁcient for the knowledge necessary to produce a
trust-based relationship is reputation. You might not have to have direct
knowledge of the ﬁrm you are going to ally yourself with; indirect information
may sufﬁce. Reputation is a proxy for knowledge (Parke, 1993). Firms that are
more established with longer track records may be more likely to be involved in
SFAs. However, when reputation takes on the role serving as a hostage asset, it
is a substitute for trust. We trust the other person not because we know of their
good work or some common identity that binds us together but because if they
renege we expose their behavior, tarnishing their reputation.
Each of the three primary building blocks of trust is integral to the formation
of a distinct type of trust. Changing levels of cognitive and emotional decision-
making processes helps to categorize different trusting relationships. Also each
element within a building block may differ in intensity which gives rise to
different types of trust.
Taxonomy of Trust
Trust is not a static concept. Shapiro et al. (1992) describe three main
categories of trust: 1) deterrence; 2) knowledge; and 3)identiﬁcation-based trust
(see Figure 3). The authors state that “. . . each previous basis of trust is a
necessary condition for the one that follows.”
Deterrence-based Trust
Deterrence-based trust is necessary when the relationship is based on little or
no knowledge. It is the lowest form of trust. This type of governance relies on the
fact that the cost (in absolute value) to each agent of defaulting on the relationship
is greater than the beneﬁts of continuing in the relationship. Deterrence-based
trust is consistent with the calculus of “economic man” and a Smithian
idiosyncratic optimizer. It is based on cognitive action, freewill and rational
economic behavior. Agents may exit freely depending on their assessment of the
costs to leave versus the beneﬁts of remaining. This type of governance structure
is the most fragile. There is such a low level of investment in the relationship that
the corresponding commitment by agents to the relationship will vary with the ebb
and ﬂow of beneﬁts that accrue to them from the relationship.
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The second or intermediate level of the Shapiro et al. (1992) taxonomy is
knowledge-based trust. As knowledge increases over time, predictability is
formed, allowing an individual to react with more certainty in regard to future
events. As a result, governance risk, the risk of a failure of the governance
structure, decreases (ceteris paribus) as an individual moves from deterrence-
based trust to knowledge-based trust. Once predictability has been achieved there
is a decrease in the importance of the deterrents in the relationship. Through
knowledge risk is reduced, though it is not dissolved (Lewis and Weigert, 1985).
Thus ﬁrms that have a history of working together have experience with strategic
alliances or, where public information is ample, would be able to establish a
higher form of trusting relationship, one based on knowledge. This, like
deterrence-based trust, is a cognitive form of trust.
Identiﬁcation-based Trust
This form of trust is based more on emotions than either deterrence-based trust
or knowledge-based trust. Identiﬁcation-based trust is the ability of an individual
to internalize another’s preferences (Shapiro et al.,1992). Identiﬁcation-based
trust is the highest level of trust attainable. In order to access this level of trust,
the partners must achieve a level of knowledge where predictability is highly
accurate, thus greatly reducing the amount of risk involved. This is achieved
through a shared culture or experience set such that your partner’s loss is your
loss. The most pure form of this type of trust occurs in family governance
Figure 3. Taxonomy of Trust
229structures, whereby a manager and his or her family operate the organization with
a consistent, uniform, and unwritten rule set.
Strategic Fuzzy Alliances and the Continuum of Governance
In order to understand the role of trust in governance, it is fundamental to be
able to integrate the notion of trust into the continuum of governance. For a
strategic fuzzy alliance to exist one must: 1) have a strategic business relationship
which is based upon trust; 2) have a noncontract-based agreement; and 3) be in a
relationship with at least one other ﬁrm.
The Spot Market
In the area of the spot market there are many buyers and sellers. A transaction
in this area of the continuum has low asset speciﬁcity and low transaction risk,
therefore neither contracts nor trust are necessary to complete a transaction. In this
region of the governance continuum a thick market condition exists providing
ample supply at the right place and time. Thus a strategic fuzzy alliance would not
exist in the area of the spot market, because trust does not exist in this area.
Vertical Integration
Trust does exist at the opposite end of the governance continuum within the
vertically integrated ﬁrm. One of the efﬁciency-enhancing characteristics of the
vertically integrated ﬁrm is the lack of need for contracting to complete each
internalized transaction. Noncontract-based agreements are the rule as agents
cooperate and coordinate within the ﬁrm with little formal governance. This type
of trust is usually at minimum knowledge-based, and often with a well-deﬁned
corporate culture, is identity-based. However, SFAs are not found at this end of
the continuum because only one ﬁrm is involved. Strategic fuzzy alliances involve
two or more ﬁrms.
Hybrid or Quasi-Integration
Throughout the central region of the continuum written contracts of some type,
not trust, are the foundation of the governance structure; therefore strategic
alliances do not exist here either. In these relationships the contract is a substitute
for trust for the purpose of binding the parties to the agreement. Since SFAs are
not found in the spot market, hybrid or vertical integration regions of the
continuum, an additional dimension needs to be added to the neoinstitutional
governance choice continuum (see Figure 4).
On the ﬁrst plane of the dual continuum, the traditional continuum of
governance is displayed. The second continuum offers an additional set of choices
for the ﬁrm. For each hybrid choice on the neoclassical continuum, there is a
matching trust-based choice which may reduce the parties’ governance costs.
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related to building relationships and acquiring knowledge. The vertical axis
reﬂects the potential probability, {0...1 } ,o fsubstituting a trust-based structure.
In the spot market the potential for contract-based alliances to be substituted for
trust- based alliances is 0, as neither trust nor contracts are necessary for
transactions to take place. A higher potential for substitution exists in the area of
hybrid structures. However, the further right one moves the probability falls,
eventually reaching zero again in the region of vertical integration. This decrease
in substitution potential reﬂects the increasing levels of asset speciﬁcity and
transaction risk, which may make informal agreements untenable.
There are two distinct governance choice forces at work. Moving from left to
right and focusing on the upper continuum, knowledge is increasing and the level
of trust needed to bind agents to an agreement is also increasing. The weakest
bond is on the left with deterrence-based trust and the strongest bond is on the
right with identiﬁcation-based trust. At the same time that trust is increasing,
transaction risk is increasing. Thus, ceteris paribus, the more risk that exists the
greater the level of knowledge that is necessary. Therefore one can theoretically
ﬁnd trust-based relationships that address many types of transactions, even some
where risk levels are fairly high. But as transaction risk increases to the highest
levels, the power of trust gives way to internalization as the only sustainable
Figure 4. Dual Continuum
231governance choice option. The issue then is for the bilateral partners to generate
the level of knowledge or identiﬁcation to match the risk imbedded in the
transaction. This process in itself is a rich area of research, but sufﬁce it is to say
that the common process of ﬁrms attempting to blend corporate cultures upon
forming alliances is an example of the knowledge/identiﬁcation building process.
In terms of hypotheses concerning ﬁrm behavior, trust-based alliances should
then be extremely rare at high levels of asset speciﬁcity. SFAs should be more
common at the left side of the continuum where transactions are relatively simple
and risk is low. As risk gets higher, because agents are opportunistic, a high level
of knowledge or identiﬁcation is needed, which is hard to develop. If one believed
that agents/ﬁrms were becoming more altruistic, in an evolutionary sense, and less
economically rational, one would expect to see the probabilities increase and the
set of transactions covered by SFAs broaden moving from left to right.
At low levels of asset speciﬁcity, deterrence-based alliances (I) are sufﬁcient to
dominate, while at high levels of asset speciﬁcity identiﬁcation trust-based
alliances (III) would be necessary. Over the middle range of asset speciﬁcity, high
levels of knowledge and low levels of identiﬁcation are needed to replace formal
contracts/ownership arrangements. The strategic fuzzy alliance continuum falls
moving from left to right reﬂecting the decreasing likelihood of formation given
the increasing transaction risk. On the right-hand side of the continuum,
transaction risk is so high that at a minimum, knowledge-based (II) or identiﬁ-
cation-based trust (III) would be required. Although theoretically unlikely,
strategic fuzzy alliances are possible at high levels of risk explaining why the line
does not fall to 0 until the area of VI is reached.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
The empirical model will be used to characterize the governance choice decision
for ﬁrms and to determine some of the important motives of ﬁrms involved in
alliances. In order for a ﬁrm to effectively determine the optimum governance
structure it must ﬁrst assess its own business characteristics in terms of motives
and preferences, which are part of the overall characteristics of the transaction.
Secondly they must make a choice as to the appropriate governance structure,
given the transaction involved. The structures along the dual continuum (Figure
4) represent the choice from which the agent/ﬁrm chooses. For any particular ﬁrm
some structures are more appropriate than others. Empirically, the best statistical
model would be one that captures the discrete choice of the decision maker. A
multinomial logit model (MNLM) is most often used in areas of study where
researchers are investigating decision choices of individuals (Ben-Akiva and
Lerman, 1985) and when the dependent variable is believed to be discrete,
nominal or random (Liao, 1994).
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3conducted in 1996
(Dionne et al., 1996). The researchers used a mail survey to contact pork and
horticultural processors in Ontario, Quebec and the western provinces about their
involvement in strategic alliances.
4,
5The total number of observations, 49, was
dependent on the number of strategic alliances per company.
The objective of this model is to determine the governance choice, in terms of
the type of alliance formed based on ﬁrm characteristics. The dependent variables
are alliance types and the independent variables are alliance attributes. The
dependent variables used in this analysis were: 1) tangible asset-based alliances
(TAAs); 2) intangible asset-based alliances (IAAs); and 3) mixed alliances
(MAs).
A TAA is an alliance where the partners utilize physical assets that are jointly
held. The agreement is held together through the use of a contract or hostage
assets and tangible measures of success are used, such as return on investment
(ROI). In terms of the Dionne survey, those respondents who deﬁned the motives
of their alliance as either: “to share assets, physical resources, or human
resources”were coded in the multinomial model to be tangible asset-based
alliances.
In an IAA, physical assets are not a feature of the alliance. Instead, it is based
on shared assets such as shared knowledge or data. In such fuzzy alliances
measures of success are intangible and as such are difﬁcult to calculate. In terms
of the Dionne survey, those respondents who deﬁned the motives of their alliance
as either: “to penetrate a new market, increase market share, conduct R&D,
coordinate marketing, conduct a joint advertising program, or to increase quality,”
were coded in the multinomial model to be intangible asset-based alliances.
A MA combines characteristics from both TAAs and IAAs giving it a hybrid
nature. As a result some aspects of a mixed alliance are measurable and others are
not. In terms of the Dionne survey, those respondents who deﬁned the motives of
their alliance as either: “to decrease costs or risk” were coded in the multinomial
model as mixed asset-based alliances.
The empirical model created for this study is shown below in linear format
(Equation 1).










The characteristics of the dependent variables I 5 {1,2,3}
where: 1 5 Tangible asset-based alliance (TAA)
2 5 Intangible asset-based alliance (IAA)
3 5 Mixed alliance (MA)
D 5 The alliance is either domestic or international.
Trust 5 The level of trust displayed in the strategic alliance.
233SP 5 Satisfaction with the alliance related to increasing sales and proﬁt.
Risk 5 Satisfaction with the alliance related to decreasing risk.
Cost 5 Satisfaction with the alliance related to decreasing cost.
Rate 5 Performance of the ﬁrm, after the alliance, as compared with other
ﬁrms in the same sector.
Know 5 Knowledge by the processor of the existence of strategic alliances in
the same industry.
Hypotheses
From the theoretical model a set of hypotheses have been established reﬂecting
the relationship between ﬁrm characteristics and the probability of selecting one
of the three governance structures
6(see Table 1).
The independent variables were:
1. whether or not the alliance was Domestic (D). This variable addresses the
question of knowledge level between alliance partners, where domestic ﬁrms
are more likely to share identity than international ﬁrms. Hypothesis 1:
Domestic alliances (HD) would be positively correlated with IAAs (Table 1).
This is also supported by Gulati (1995) who found that nonasset-based
alliances were likely to be domestic, while asset-based alliances were more
likely to be international.
2. the level of trust present in the alliance (T). This was a direct question as to
the role that trust played in one’s satisfaction with the alliance.
7Hypothesis 2:
trust (HT) was hypothesized to be positively correlated with IAAs. This was
surmised as IAAs do not use contracts to enforce the alliance. Trust was
believed to be prominent in this relationship.
3-5. whether or not satisfaction with the alliance was related to increasing sales
and proﬁt (SP), or reducing risk (R) and/or costs (C). This variable addressed
the level and role of calculable and speciﬁc measures as critical to the
alliance. Fuzzy alliances are by deﬁnition based on intangible goals often
allowing each member to value the beneﬁts of the alliances individually.




HD Pos (1) Neg (2)
HT Pos (1) Neg (2)
HSP Neg (2) Pos (1)
HB Pos (1) Pos (1) Neg (2)
HC Ambiguous Ambiguous
HRATE Neg (2) Pos (1)
H
K Pos (1) Neg (2)
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alliance. SP is highly measurable and as such was hypothesized to be
positively correlated with TAAs. R is an intangible measure of success and
thus was surmised to be positively correlated with IAAs or MAs. The
hypothesis for C was ambiguous because the type of cost being addressed was
not speciﬁed by Dionne et al., 1996. An SFA reduces both governance and
bureaucratic costs; thus it can be hypothesized that this variable should be
positively correlated to IAAs. However, because cost is a highly measurable
variable it can also be hypothesized that it is positively correlated to TAAs.
6. how the performance of the ﬁrm compared to other ﬁrms in the same sector
(RATE). Hypothesis 6: rate, (HRATE), was expected to be positively
correlated to TAAs, as the attribute is related to measurability and more likely
to be used by tangible asset-based alliances.
7. whether strategic alliances were a common strategy in the industry; as
measured by the knowledge of the processor of the existence of strategic
alliances in the same industry (Know). Hypothesis 7: the industry standard
knowledge (HK) was predicted to be positively correlated with IAAs. This is
because ﬁrms with a greater understanding of strategic alliances in their
industry, may be more partisan about, and thus more comfortable with,
trust-based governance structures than those ﬁrms involved in TAAs.
Multinomial Logit Model Results
Goodness of Fit
8
In this study the empirical model was evaluated using two types of tests,
goodness of ﬁt (GOF) and coefﬁcient estimates. The GOF tests, of which four
were used, evaluate the overall performance of a chosen model. The four tests
used were: 1) predicted outcomes; 2) independence from irrelevant outcomes
(IIA); 3) pseudo R
2 ; and 4) chi-square. In terms of predicted outcomes the model
had a 71% accuracy rate. In terms of the IIA test the dependent variables were
shown to be sufﬁciently different from each other and do not present a problem
for respondents to distinguish between them, thus the model satisﬁes the IIA
condition. The pseudo R
2 for this model was 0.28. Predicting the pseudo R
2
though tends to underestimate the underlying continuous variable (DeMarris,
1992). Finally, a chi-square
9test was conducted to test whether or not all
coefﬁcients simultaneously equal zero. For this model (x
2 5 22.36, df 5 13, p ,
0.05) the alternate hypothesis, which states that at least one of the predictors has
a signiﬁcant impact on at least one of the logits, is accepted.
Coefﬁcient Estimates
The second evaluative measure of the performance of the model was to analyze
the coefﬁcient estimates. Three coefﬁcient estimate tests were used in this study:
1) a global test for predictors, 2) the t-statistic, and 3) the transitivity test.
235Global Test for Predictors
The global test for predictors
10was used to determine if any particular predictor
has an effect on any of the logits. When the predictors were tested individually,
cost was signiﬁcant at the .05 level; sales/proﬁt, risk and knowledge were
signiﬁcant at the .01 level of signiﬁcance. Thus, these variables have a signiﬁcant
impact on at least one of the dependent variables. Although trust was not
signiﬁcant at the .10, level it was signiﬁcant at the .15 level of signiﬁcance. The
other variables used in the model were not signiﬁcant.
T-test, Coefﬁcient Estimates, and Transitivity Test
A t-test was used to determine the signiﬁcance of the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. The degrees of freedom in this model were
42. In a multinomial logit model; if the sign of the coefﬁcient estimate is negative,
the independent variable positively inﬂuences the reference category and is
negatively correlated to the alternative variable (Liao, 1994; Ben-Akiva, 1985).
The transitivity test measures the consistency across independent variables in their
affect on the probability of governance choice. The results of the multinomial
logit model are shown below (see Table 2).
Table 2. Results of the Multinomial Logit Model




Intercept 20.93 22.71 21.78 NA
(20.47) (21.23) (20.79)
Domestic 21.16 20.25 0.91 I . M . T
(20.97) (20.24) (0.73)
Trust 20.40 0.09 0.49 M . I . T
(21.37) (0.35) (1.70)*
Sales/Proﬁt 0.20 21.05 21.25 T . I . M
(0.17) (21.14) (21.12)
Risk 21.98 0.27 2.25 M . I . T
(21.40) (0.27) (1.66)*
Cost 3.96 2.34 21.63 T . M . I
(2.90)** (2.61)** (21.17)
Rate 0.79 0.39 20.39 T . M . I
(1.15) (0.68) (20.62)
Know 21.86 1.05 2.91 M . I . T
(21.59) (0.72) (1.90)*
Summary of Statistics
Number of Cases 5 49
L(0) 52 51.10
L(1) 52 36.78
22 [L(0)2L(1)] 5 28.65
Degrees of Freedom 5 13 (Chi-square)
Pseudo R
2 5 .28
Percent Correctly Predicted 5 71%
Note: 1&2-T h edependent variable was ICT (I was the reference category)
3 - The dependent variable was TCI (T was the reference category)
The values in parentheses are the t-values for the respective variables
*signiﬁcant at the .10 level of conﬁdence
**signiﬁcant at the .01 level of conﬁdence
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Consistent with the hypothesis, though not signiﬁcant at the .10 level, this
variable appears to be positively correlated with intangible asset-based alliances,
and negatively correlated with tangible asset-based alliances. The pair-wise
comparison met the transitivity test where an intangible was preferred to a
tangible, an intangible was preferred to a mixed, and a mixed was preferred to a
tangible (I . M . T).
Trust (HT)
Though not signiﬁcant at the .10 level, trust appears to be positively correlated
with intangible asset-based alliances and negatively correlated with tangible
asset-based alliances. This was also hypothesized correctly. Mixed alliances
appears to be negatively correlated to trust, which is understandable as those
involved in these alliances prefer foreign agreements. However, signiﬁcant at the
.10 level, trust is preferred more in a mixed alliance than in a tangible asset-based
alliance. The pair-wise comparison met the transitivity test where a mixed was
preferred to an intangible, an intangible was preferred to a tangible, and a mixed
was preferred to a tangible (M I T). For the model comparing T versus I, trust was
not found to be signiﬁcant, however as stated by Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985),
“. . . the inability to reject the hypothesis that some coefﬁcient is zero at a
particular signiﬁcance level does not imply that the hypothesis must be accepted.”
This variable, although not signiﬁcant at the .10 level of conﬁdence, was
signiﬁcant at the .17 level of conﬁdence, and may therefore have some inﬂuence
on the probability of governance choice.
Sales and Proﬁt (HSP)
Though the sign on the estimated coefﬁcient indicates that sales and proﬁt were
positively correlated with tangible asset-based alliances and negatively correlated
with intangible asset-based alliances, which is consistent with the hypothesis, the
estimates were not signiﬁcant at the .10 level. This is consistent with the model
comparing tangible and mixed alliances (M vs. T) where satisfaction due to sales
and proﬁt performance was more associated with tangible than the mixed
alliances. The pair-wise comparison met the transitivity test where a tangible was
preferred to an intangible, an intangible was preferred to a mixed, and a tangible
was preferred to a mixed alliance (T . I . M).
Risk (HR)
It was hypothesized that the objective of decreasing risk, because as a goal it
was more abstract and unmeasurable, would be positively correlated to IAAs and
MAs while being negatively correlated to TAAs. This was accurate as risk was
positively correlated with intangible asset-based alliances and negatively corre-
237lated with tangible asset-based alliances. When comparing MAs versus TAAs,
risk was positively correlated with the mixed alliances and was signiﬁcantly
different from zero at the .10 level of conﬁdence. Comparing TAAs vs IAAs, risk
is not signiﬁcant at the .10 level of conﬁdence, however it is signiﬁcant at the .17
level of signiﬁcance. The pair-wise comparison met the transitivity test where a
mixed alliance was preferred to an intangible, an intangible was preferred to a
tangible, and a mixed was preferred to a tangible alliance (M . I . T).
Cost (HC)
Cost was positively correlated with both tangible asset and mixed asset-based
alliances, and negatively correlated with intangible asset-based alliances. The
hypothesis for this variable was ambiguous because there was more than one type
of cost that the respondent could have taken into consideration. Cost was
signiﬁcant at the .01 level of conﬁdence when TAAs and MAs were compare with
IAAs. The pair-wise comparison met the transitivity test where a tangible was
preferred to a mixed alliance, a mixed was preferred to an intangible, and a
tangible was preferred to an intangible (T . M . I).
Rate (HRate)
The question from which this variable was determined asked the respondent to
compare their ﬁrm with others in the same sector. It was hypothesized that rate
would be positively correlated to TAAs and negatively correlated to IAAs, as rate
is a measurable variable. Empirically, though insigniﬁcant at the .10 level, this
appears to be correct as rate was positively correlated with tangible asset-based
alliances, and negatively correlated with intangible asset- based alliances. The
pair-wise comparison met the transitivity test where a tangible was preferred to a
mixed alliance, a mixed was preferred to an intangible, and a tangible was
preferred to an intangible (T . M . I).
Knowledge (HK)
Knowledge was used as an industry standard to determine if alliances were so
prevalent as to be common. It was hypothesized that ﬁrms involved in IAAs were
more likely to have information about their sector due to the nature of the alliance.
Knowledge was positively correlated with intangible asset-based alliances, and
negatively correlated with tangible asset- based alliances. The pair-wise compar-
ison met the transitivity test where a mixed alliance was preferred to an intangible,
an intangible was preferred to a tangible, and a mixed was preferred to a tangible
alliance (M . I . T). This variable was positively correlated to mixed alliances
and signiﬁcant at a .10 level of conﬁdence.
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Overall the model performed with theoretical consistency, not only satisfying
the speciﬁed hypotheses but meeting the transitivity tests. The model demon-
strates that a discrete choice or managerial decision is in fact being made as to
governance choice. From survey summary statistics and the results of the MNLM,
it is clear that when ﬁrms think about strategic alliances there is a continued
reliance on traditional governance and evaluative measures, i.e., increasing sales
and proﬁt, reduced costs, and performance comparisons with the rest of the
industry. These alliances are not fuzzy, but strategic thrusts requiring standard
governance control.
At the same time, as the theory predicted, there is a place for strategic fuzzy
alliances. They are knowledge and trust dependent and are distinct from
tangible-based alliances. For example:
1. the multinomial logit model showed domestic alliances were more likely to be
governed by intangible asset-based alliances (SFAs) than international alli-
ances. Thus, for these alliances, knowledge will be higher, communication
easier, and trust greater.
there was a distinct difference with respect to the difﬁcult and idiosyncratic measure
of risk reduction, which is consistent with Sporleder’s (1992) notion of an alliance
with fuzzy rules and governance. In such transaction environments control is weak,
the rules are fuzzy and the securing mechanism was most likely a form of trust.
The notion that mixed alliances, those based on motivations that were poorly
speciﬁed (being both measurable and unmeasurable), should fall in between
intangible and tangible alliances was correct on only three of seven variables.
Econometrically, it was correct to specify it as a distinct choice, but in effect it
was more similar to the intangible alliance than the tangible alliance.
When asked about the success of the ﬁrm before and after the alliance, 71%
said the ﬁrm was doing better than before the alliance.
11They are durable as well;
a majority of alliances have been in place 5-plus years. This bodes well for
strategic alliances in general, although it may more accurately reﬂect tangible
asset-based alliances. Though respondents were obviously comfortable with the
term alliance, clearly their deﬁnitions varied across the governance spectrum,
some being very similar to tradition business relationships involving some form
of a contract, while others involved a high level of trust. But overall, tangible
assets and measurability were the rule, not the exception.
When the results of the survey, the discrete choice model and the theory of
Figure 4 are brought together it becomes clear managers are solving a tradeoff
problem (Williamson, 1975; Goldsmith and Sporleder, 1998). Like the calculus
that agents solve between the bureaucracy and the market (Williamson, 1975),
239agents, over a relevant range, choose between trust-based and contract -based
mechanisms, or some hybrid of the two. This is consistent with Ring and Van de
Ven (1992) and Chiles and McMackin (1996) who point out that the relationship
between transaction risk, trust, and governance choice is complex and that there
could be a simple mapping would be naive.
Where our research differs from Ring and Van de Ven (1992) is with respect
to their notion of the relational contract. They state, “because risk is high in these
transactions (high asset speciﬁcity, high uncertainty, and a high level of
recurrence
12), high levels of trust are not only sufﬁcient; they are also necessary”
(p. 492). The above empirics do not bear this out. Those alliances that were
tangible-based (higher degrees of asset speciﬁcity) had a lower probability of
relying on trust. Similarly, those alliances which had lower levels of knowledge,
implying greater risk levels, too relied on tangible alliances. True trust-based
fuzzy alliances were reserved for lower risk, higher knowledge, lower speciﬁcity
settings. We would argue that under high transaction risk situations, as described
above, ﬁrms would choose to integrate rather than attempt to invest in a
“. . . private ordering emerging from . . . a ‘state of union’:an evolving set of
safeguards that are mutually agreed to by and for, the immediate parties... ”R i n g
and Van de Ven (1992, p. 492). A classic example of this are the causative forces
that gave rise to the U.S. dairy cooperative movement that began in the early
1900’s and continues today. Faced with high levels of transaction risk in the
marketing of their milk, dairy producers, en masse, integrated downstream to the
ﬁrst handler stage of the market rather than attempt to form relational contracts
with milk processors. The cost of building a “private set of safeguards that were
mutually agreed upon” was and is too high for producers. Instead they opted to
internalize the transaction.
Finally, respondent knowledge of the industry in regard to strategic alliances is
high, as 76% of respondents said they knew of strategic alliances in the industry,
thus implying that strategic alliances are common. As mentioned above there was
some statistical evidence from the model that those managers who had greater
knowledge (of alliances) were more likely to be associated with IAA or MAA.
Tangible-based alliances may evolve into an intangible asset-based alliance, the
logic being that by increasing knowledge and trust, a contract can be substituted
by trust. This is supported by empirical research done by Gulati (1995). On the
other hand, though most respondents were familiar with strategic alliances and
had a duration of greater than ﬁve years, most alliances were TAA and more likely
consisted of a low degree of trust. If the ﬁrm is satisﬁed with the tangible
asset-based alliance they may not be motivated to change governance structures.
An alliance that is trust-based may seem to have barriers, due to the costs of
relationship-building, that traditional business structures do not. The high level of
knowledge or trust needed to initiate and pursue an alliance of this type may deter
individuals more familiar with the traditional governance structures.
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The motivation for this study was to understand the role of trust in governance.
Neoinstitutional economics, while being extremely microanalytical with respect
to governance, appears to have left out the notion of trust. Much of transaction
theory is devoted to the role of contracts and bureaucracies to offset agent
opportunism, information impact, and transaction risk, yet empirically, trust-
based governance structures exist and can perform quite well. Trust-based
alliances reduce costs, increase efﬁciency, and allow ﬂexibility necessary for
success in a rapidly changing market place. Trust-based alliances cannot be
directly placed on the Williamson (1975) governance choice continuum of
markets, contracts and hierarchies thus making it necessary to create a dual
continuum. This manuscript developed an additional continuum of governance
with substitute trust-based structures.
13
Trust-based governance is not a complete substitute for all forms of traditional
governance though. At low levels of speciﬁcity and transaction risk, neither trust
nor contracts are necessary to complete a transaction. At the highest levels of
speciﬁcity, trust is critical to the transaction, but risk is so high as to require
integration. In the middle or hybrid area where many transactions occur;
traditionally governed through contacting, of one form or another, one ﬁnds
trust-based agreements as well. The potential for trust to substitute for a contract
and the ability for trust to offset transaction risk is a function of knowledge and
predictability. Thus, theoretically, one would predict that fuzzy alliances are more
likely to be found governing transactions of low speciﬁcity and transaction risk.
Agents may not be willing to make the investment in knowledge and identity
building. Though the above survey was not a random sample, it does characterize
the alliances of the study ﬁrms where tangible-based alliances and their measur-
able performance dominated. This empirical result and its supporting theory
stands at odds with the comment made by Axelrod (in Hill, 1990): individuals that
stress cooperation and trust rather than opportunism dominate the population of
players.
Integrating Shapiro’s taxonomy of trust into a neoinstitutional model of
governance choice, a move from low to high forms of knowledge and predict-
ability can offset greater and greater amounts of transaction risk. The lowest levels
of trust, based on deterrence, does not require greater altruism on the part of
bilateral trading partners as they are based strictly on economic rationality and
idiosyncratic measurement of costs and beneﬁts. This is useful as it reconciles any
apparent contradiction between trust-based governance and neoinstitutional the-
ories of opportunism.
For managers the theory and empirical test put forth in this manuscript helps
remove some of the mysticism being attached to alliances and their use of trust.
Trust can be an important transaction governance mechanism but there are severe
241limits on its ability to control risk, particularly the investment needed in
relationship building. Das and Teng (1998) state:
to trust and to control seem to be two completely different kinds of approaches. When
it is fully possible to trust a partner, there is no need to control its behavior. Control
comes into play only when adequate trust is not present (p. 495).
Traditional mechanisms for attenuating transaction risk such as contracts and
joint ventures still dominate the governance space. As this manuscript and the
lengthy literature on trust conveys, trust is an investment in a relationship;
depending on the transaction environment and agent characteristics, an investment
which may or may not be worth making.
For managers looking to engage in a trust-based relationship, the form of the
relationship will, in part, be a function of the risk characteristics of the mutual
transaction. Trust can be very cost effective and efﬁcient for regulating transac-
tions, but there are severe limits to trust’s enforcement powers. By increasing
knowledge and familiarity between the transaction partners, trust and its power
can be enhanced. This “investment” in a relationship can generate excellent
returns in terms of lower monitoring costs and better performance. The manager’s
problem as to governance choice is a tradeoff problem. While trust and investment
in trust can be beneﬁcial, there is a risk that the relationship will fail. While the
expectation for corporate life may be inﬁnite, the expectations for alliance life
may need to be less than inﬁnite. This can be due to the dynamics of the
marketplace creating alternative opportunities for a transaction partner or it could
be due to opportunistic behavior by the partner. It is the stochastic nature of this
disruption that exposes managers to governance risk.
Given this, the manager must decide whether the risk in the relationship is
worth taking. The manager must look at the downside risk of the relationship as
well the upside opportunities. A fundamental component of answering the
tradeoff problem is how valuable a set of assets can the manager place at risk?
These assets may be physical assets such as a linked production facility,
intellectual property such as ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge, or intangible assets such as
a brand. The risk to underlying assets is especially acute in the economic
environment of the food industry where the landscape can change so dramatically.
Thus if risk is high, control is paramount for a manager. Trust-based arrangements
are limited in their ability to control. There are though examples of high risk, yet
trust-based governance mechanisms. For example, family-owned and operated
organizations, utilizing the highest form of trust, identity trust, can rely on an
informal set of rules even though asset risk is high (a comparative advantage of
nepotism). For the average ﬁrm though, to achieve this degree of knowledge and
familiarity is difﬁcult and rare. Trust-based relationships should be used where
underlying asset risk is low, exit and entry speed are paramount, ﬂexibility is
important, and exit costs are minimal. As the relationship evolves and more
242 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 2/1999experiences are common, the relationship is able to support more risk. Alterna-
tively, hybridization can occur where formal arrangements are made for broad
goals and objectives, and day-to-day decisions are left to trust.
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Success of a trust-based alliance is rooted in knowledge and a proper matching
of the limits of the relationship to each ﬁrm’s expectations. Knowledge and
familiarity are important lubricants to keeping a relationship moving forward.
Transaction partners represent different histories, cultures and norms. By building
knowledge through interaction and common experiences, suspicions and unwar-
ranted fears are displaced. Thus an investment in relationship maintenance
programming, such as regular communication, joint meetings, or common leisure
activities can aid partners build trust. Certainly choosing a partner with a
compatible set of norms is advantageous for maintaining a successful relationship.
Since trust is a function of familiarity, the more one partner can identify with the
other, the greater will be the understanding and the more easily suspicions will be
displaced. Finally, a successful relationship can be helped by having realistic
expectations of the informal arrangement. In light of this, partners should ex ante,
unilaterally as well as bilaterally, clarify their expectations and examine success-
ful as well as failed relationship scenarios. This would help partners avoid
governance misalignment (the wrong governance structure for the transaction) by
identifying the transaction risk characteristics, their own level of comfort with
their partner, and their expectations as to outcomes.
The crux of the issue which this paper addresses is: what is the role of trust in
governance? It reduces to a question of the impact of opportunism on the
transaction interface and the ability for agents to depart from strict economic
rationality and engage in relationship building. It is clear that knowledge and
identiﬁcation enhance trust, but is it, ceteris paribus, sufﬁcient to offset moderate
to high levels of transaction risk?
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NOTES
1. Previously, ﬁrms chose partners not conducting business in the same competitive space as
themselves but, more often than not, in the same industry. Therefore a level of familiarity
existed between them allowing contracts to be designed using a common experience set, thus,
reducing the transaction risk of the agreement. More recently, however, ﬁrms have been
aligning themselves with partners with whom they are less familiar such as: competitors,
suppliers, distributors and non-competing ﬁrms (Troy, 1994; Bamford and Jamieson, 1989). For
example: 1) Domino’s Pizza uses networks set-up by Coca-Cola when entering new markets in
243other countries (Bamford, 1994), and 2) To save on cost, Pillsbury ships products on the same
trucks as their competitors and then actively competes against them in the marketplace (Andel,
1996). Under these new arrangements a ﬁrm’s knowledge base is less applicable, as past
experience in their own industry may not be helpful when working with ﬁrms in another sector.
Strategic contract alliances, formed within the same competitive space, have a higher level of
risk than previous arrangements formed with non-competitors.
2. A universal deﬁnition for strategic alliances does not exist. They have been described as
agreements between two or more ﬁrms, in the same sector, banding together to achieve a
common goal (Vyas, Shelburn and Rogers, 1995; Troy, 1994; Reger, 1993). To help enforce the
relationship, hostage assets and contracts can be used (Westgren, 1994; Borys and Jemison,
1989).
3. For an overview of this survey see Adams (1998).
4. The overall return rate was 33%.
Statistical Overview of Survey Data
The results of the frequency analysis showed that 73% of the respondents
questioned were involved in domestic alliances and 26% were involved in foreign
alliances. 82% of the alliances were described as involved in vertical moves,
while 6% involved horizontal moves. In 39% of the cases, the governance choice
of the ﬁrm was a short-term contract, less than 5 years; 24% chose a joint venture;
and 21% chose a long-term contract. Of the cases studied, 94% of the alliances
still existed and 76% of respondents were satisﬁed with the results of the alliance.
27% of the respondents selected a high level of trust, 33% a mid level of trust, and
14% a low level of trust when describing characteristics integral to their
satisfaction of the alliance. When asked what performance criteria best illustrated
the respondents’ satisfaction, 63% said sales and proﬁt had increased, 24% felt
that risk had been reduced and 43% said that costs had been decreased. Rating the
performance of the ﬁrm after the alliance, as compared with before the alliance,
71% felt performance had improved, 16% found that there had been no change
and 10% discovered that performance had decreased. When compared with other
companies in the same sector after the alliance, 79% thought the ﬁrm’s
performance levels had improved, 10% felt there had been no improvement and
6% found performance had decreased. When asked about their knowledge of
alliances in their sector, 76% had previous knowledge of alliances in their
industry, and 14% did not.
6. Mixed alliances do not appear in all the hypotheses because they are
assumed to lie between the other two alliances, as it has been deﬁned as a
hybrid of tangible and intangible-based alliances. Speciﬁc theory related to
these types of alliances does not exist.
7. In the original survey respondents were asked as to “. . . describe the
motives that seem to be responsible for your degree of satisfaction.” Their
choices were trust, respect and competence. They could mark only one or
all three. We re-coded the answers into a ﬁve point Likert scale (below) to
244 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 2/1999be used as the independent variable, Trust. A response of trust alone would
signify the purest motivation in terms of the independent variable, while
competence, signaling a strong element of measurability, substitutes for
trust in supporting the alliance.
8. When a multinomial logit model is utilized, one of the dependent variables
is dropped and it becomes the reference category; this is the element
against which the other dependent variables are compared. For this study
there were three dependent variables: tangible asset-based alliances
(TAA), intangible asset-based alliances (IAA), and mixed alliances (MA).
The ﬁrst variable in each run of the model was the reference category, i.e.,
IMT, I 5 0, the reference category, M 5 1, and T 5 2. The three models
run were: 1) MTI, 2) TMI, and 3) IMT.
1. GOF Test #1: Predicted Outcomes
The model was used to predict the governance choice decision {0, 1, or 2}. This
prediction was then compared to the actual choice. The higher the percentage of
correct predictions, the better the goodness of ﬁt. In this case 21 out of 28 cases were
accurately predicted to be an IAA, 8 out of 12 cases were correctly determined to
be an MA and 6 out of 10 cases were rightly predicted to be a TAA. By dividing
the total of these correct predictions 35, by the total number of cases, 49, the
percentage accurately predicted was found to be 71%.
2. GOF Test #2: Independence from Irrelevant Outcomes (IIA)
The test for IIA is a test for irrelevant alternatives and one of the most critical for
multinomial logit models. It tests whether the decision-maker truly has a choice set,
as speciﬁed in the model. In the case of the above model, it tests for the discreteness
of the governance choices. This test was conducted by dropping one of the
dependent variables at a time, running a reduced model, and then comparing the
signs, values, and the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient estimates to those of the full
model. Of the potential 21 sign changes (7*3), there were 4 sign changes all related
to variables (Sales and Proﬁt, Domestic, and Rate) which had insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcient estimates in the full model and insigniﬁcant estimates in the reduced
models. Estimated coefﬁcient values and signiﬁcance levels were little changed.









245conclude that the dependent variables are sufﬁciently different from each other, and
do not present a problem for respondents to distinguish between them. The model
satisﬁes the IIA condition.
GOF Test #3: Pseudo R
2
The pseudo R
2 determines how related the predictors are to the dependent variables.
This test uses the log likelihood values of the full (L1) and reduced models (L0). The
pseudo R
2 for this model was 0.28. However, it should be noted that this method of
predicting the pseudo R
2 tends to underestimate the underlying continuous variable
(DeMarris, 1992).
GOF Test #4: Chi-square
A chi-square tests whether or not all coefﬁcients simultaneously equal zero. For this
study the log likelihood function for the full model, L1, was 36.78. The log
likelihood function if all the coefﬁcients, except the intercept, are 0; L0, was 51.10.
The chi-square value is determined by subtracting L1 from L0. For this model (x
2 5
22.36, df 5 13, p , 0.05) the alternate hypothesis, which states that at least one of
the predictors has a signiﬁcant impact on at least one of the logits, is accepted.
9. Chi-square 52 2log (L0/L1) 5 (22log L0) 2 (22 log L1) 52 2 (log L 2
logL1)
10. A global predictor test is used to determine if a particular predictor (X1) has
an effect on any of the logits being tested. The test is performed by running the
full model and then running a reduced model, which excludes the predictor the
researcher wishes to test. The chi-square value from the restricted model is
then subtracted from the chi-square value for the full-model, the degrees of
freedom are M21, where M equals the number of dependent variables. The
null hypothesis is that X1 has no effect on any of the M 21 logits. The
alternate then, is that X1 has an effect on at least one of the logits. If the test
is signiﬁcant then Ho is rejected and the researcher can assume that the
predictor being tested has an effect on at least one of the logits.
11. See note 5.
12. See Goldsmith and Sporleder (1998) and their discussion of “frequency.”
13. It is certainly possible, and probably the norm to think that the governance
choice decision may involve a combination of trust and contracting and that it
is not simply a binary choice.
14. This is commonly done with employment contracts. While the risk is too high
to rarely permit a fully trust-based arrangement, the larger issues such as
wages and beneﬁts are speciﬁed while the day-to-day conduct is left to the
employees’ discretion.
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